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SUPREME

COURT WATCH
By Reginald C. Oh
n its 2003-04 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an at
tempt to clarify its First Amendment jurisprudence on the
religion clauses, handed down its decision in Locke v.
Davey, No. 02-1315, 2004 WL 344123 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2004).
In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that the State ofWashing
ton did not violate the First Amendment Free Exercise
Clause by denying government financial aid to college stu
dents seeking to pursue a course of study in religious devo
tional studies.
In clarifying its free exercise jurisprudence, the Court in
Davey properly held that the mere fact that a law facially dis
criminates against religion should not automatically render
the law presumptively unconstitutional and therefore trigger
heightened judicial review. This holding is consistent with
the Court's institutional role to not intervene into state po
litical processes unless the state is significantly burdening and
infringing upon fundamental constitutional rights. In other
words, under Davey, the fact that a statute facially discrimi
nates against religion does not, by itse!f, create a constitution
ally cognizable burden on the right to freely exercise religion.
At issue in this case was the State of Washington's
"Promise Scholarship Program," which was established in
1999 to provide financial assistance to gifted low-income
students pursuing a postsecondary education. The program
provides students who meet certain eligibility requirements
with scholarships, renewable for one year, which students can
use to defray postsecondary education-related expenses. The
scholarships are funded through the state's general fund and
the amount varies from year to year. For the academic year
1999-2000, the scholarship was worth $1,125. For the acad
emic year 2000--01, the scholarship was worth $1,542. Under
the program, students are eligible for the scholarship if they
meet certain academic, income, and enrollment require
ments. The program even permits students who are eligible
to receive a Promise Scholarship to attend a religiously affili-
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ated private institution of higher education.
The program, however, prohibits otherwise eligible students
from receiving a Promise Scholarship if they decide to pursue a
course ofstudy in religious devotional studies. The statute states,
"No aid shall be awarded to any student who is pursuing a de
gree in theology."WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.10.814 (1997). Al
though the term "a degree in theology" is not defined in the
statute, the statute codifies the Washington Constitution's own
Establishment Clause, which states, "No public money or prop
erty shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious wor
ship, exercise or instruction, or the support ofany religious es
tablishment." WASH. CONST. art. I,§ 11.
Respondent Joshua Davey, a Promise Scholar recipient,
enrolled at Northwest College to pursue a double-major in
pastoral ministries and business management/administra
tion. Northwest College is a private, religiously affiliated
school. At the beginning of the 1999-2000 academic year,
Davey was informed by the school's director of financial aid
that he could not use his scholarship ifhe decided to pursue
a major in religious devotional studies. He was told that in
order to receive his scholarship funds, he must sign a form
stating that he would not be pursuing a degree in devotional
studies at the school. He refused to sign the form and was de
nied the scholarship.
Davey then brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 al
leging that the denial ofhis scholarship based on his decision
to pursue a pastoral ministries major violated the First
Amendment Establishment, Free Exercise, and Free Speech
Clauses, and that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause. The district court rejected his con
stitutional claims, but on appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed
and held that Washington's statute denying public funds to
students pursuing devotional studies violated the Free Exer
cise Clause. The State ofWashington appealed the decision
to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari.
The Court held that Washington's statute did not violate
the Free Exercise Clause. In an opinion written by ChiefJus
tice Rehnquist, the Court framed the issue as one involving
a tension or "play in the joints" between the command of the
Establishment Clause and the protections of the Free Exer
cise Clause. The conflict arises when a state's attempt to avoid
an establishment ofreligion seemingly discriminates against
religion and arguably burdens the right to freely exercise reli
gion. Thus, in Davey, respondent Davey argued that the
State ofWashington, in denying scholarships to people pur
suing religious devotional studies, infringed upon his right
to freely exercise religion. The State ofWashington respond
ed that it had to exclude funding religious studies in order to
prevent an establishment of religion breach according to the
state's constitution.
Although the state could have decided to fund religious
studies without violating the federal Establishment Clause,
see Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servicesfar the Blind, 474
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U.S. 481 (1989), the question before the Court in Davey was
whether the State ofWashington could follow the command
of its own more restrictive establishment clause and deny
public funding of religious studies without running afoul of
the federal Free Exercise Clause.
The Court concluded that the State ofWashington may
properly exclude religious studies from its scholarship pro
gram without violating the Free Exercise Clause, even
though the program facially discriminates with respect to re
ligion. For the Court, there were two key factors that it used
to conclude that the State ofWashington did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause: first, the Court emphasized that the
program created minimal burdens on the right to freely ex
ercise religion, and second, the Court concluded that the
State ofWashington did not act with animus toward religion
and religious groups in excluding religious training studies
from its scholarship program.
The Court concluded that Washington's statute did not
create significant burdens on the right of free exercise. The
Court distinguished the state's denial ofpublic funding for re
ligious studies from the law in Church efLukumi BabaluAye,
Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), which the Court held was
unconstitutional because it unreasonably burdened religious
rights by making it a crime to engage in certain forms ofritu
alistic animal slaughter. In that case, the Court reasoned that
the criminal prohibition against animal slaughter suppressed a
practice central to that of a particular religion, and therefore
the Court concluded that the law not only facially discrimi
nated against religion, but it also created an unreasonable bur
den on the right to freely exercise religion.
In contrast, in Davey, the Court emphasized that Wash
ington's law denying scholarships to students pursuing reli
gious devotional studies has only a "minimal" burden on reli
gious rights. The program's exclusion does not impose any
criminal or civil sanctions on a religious rite, as did the law in
Lukumi. Moreover, the law does not absolutely deny or de
prive a person a right or entitlement based on his or her reli
gious beliefs or course of religious study. The student is still
free to pursue his choice of study, but in doing so, he or she
may not receive government funding to subsidize his choice.
Second, the Court emphasized that the program's exclu
sion of religious studies does not indicate the state's hostility
or animus toward religion or religious groups. The state's de
sire to treat training for religious professions differently from
training for secular professions reflects the state's goal ofpre
serving a strict separation between the state and religion,
rather than an overt hostility toward religion. This conclusion
was supported by the fact that, overall, the Promise Scholar
ship Program "goes a long way toward including religion in
its benefits." For example, the Court noted that the program
permits scholarships to be granted to students attending
"pervasively religious schools," and that a student like Davey
could still take devotional theology courses even if they may
not study theology as majors.
Thus, the Court concluded that mere facial discrimina
tion ofreligion does not automatically give rise to a presump
tion of unconstitutionality. Rather, to determine whether a
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law that facially discriminates on the basis ofreligion should
be subject to strict scrutiny for purposes offree exercise doc
trine, the Court effectively held that it must conduct a two
part inquiry into (1) whether the facially discriminatory law
unreasonably burdens the right of religious expression and
(2) whether the law reflects hostility or animus against reli
gion or religious groups. In Davey, the Court concluded that
the Promise Scholarship Program's exclusion of funding for
religious studies did not burden the right of religious expres
sion and was not motivated by animus toward religion. Ac
cordingly, the law was not presumed to be unconstitutional,
and the Court reviewed the Scholarship Program under ra
tional basis review rather than under strict scrutiny review.
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, an opinion
joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Scalia contended
that the program violated the Free Exercise Clause because
it facially discriminates against religion, and because the state
has no compelling interest to justify its discrimination. For
Justice Scalia, the key to a free exercise analysis is whether the
law facially discriminates against religion. If a law is not fa
cially neutral with respect to religion, Justice Scalia contends
that, under Lukumi, the Court must apply strict scrutiny to
determine the constitutionality of the law. Under strict
scrutiny analysis, Justice Scalia concluded that the law was
not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.
The law singled out religion for denial of funding, and he
could find no compelling interest to justify such discrimina
tion against religion.
Justice Scalia characterized the paradigmatic harm that
the Free Exercise Clause seeks to protect as the dignitary
harm caused by "being singled out for special burdens on the
basis ofone's religious calling... ."Davey, 2004 WL 344123
at 8. He called such a dignitary burden "so profound that the
concrete harm produced can never be dismissed as insubstan
tial." Id. Justice Scalia's reasoning is consistent with his rea
soning in equal protection jurisprudence dealing with racial
classifications. In fact, he even cites to Brown v. Board ifEd
ucation, 347 U.S.483 (1954) (holding that public schools seg
regated on the basis ofrace violates equal protection), to sup
port his proposition that facial discrimination, whether on
the basis of race or religion, by itself creates a constitutional
ly cognizable harm, regardless ofwhether or not the law ac
tually has a significant burden on fundamental rights.
Essentially, Justice Scalia seems to consider the abstract,
formal "dignitary harm" caused anytime the state facially dis
criminates on the basis of religion as being the central con
cern ofthe Free Exercise Clause. Yet, curiously, he is less con
cerned about whether the right to freely exercise religion is
actually harmed or burdened by facially discriminatory or fa
cially neutral government regulations. For example, he wrote
the majority decision in Employment Div., Dep't efHuman
Res. if Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in which the
Court held that a facially neutral law with general application
does not implicate the Free Exercise Clause even if the ef
fect ofthe law is to substantially interfere with religious prac
tices and beliefs.
continued on page 15
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Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, however, effectively
rebuts Justice Scalia's contention that a facially discriminato
ry law presumptively creates a dignitary burden on religion.
The Court emphasized that Washington's Promise Program
was not borne out of animus toward religion and religious
groups, especially since the program permits students to at
tend religiously affiliated schools and still receive a Promise
scholarship. The lack of animus toward religion on the State
ofWashington's part minimizes any concern that the law's
purpose or effect is to demean religion in any significant way.
In other words, the majority concluded that any dignitary
harm caused by application of a facially discriminatory law
does not arise from the mere fact that a law facially discrimi
nates, but arises only if the discrimination is a manifestation
of the state's animus or hostility to religion. Thus, although
Washington's program discriminates against religion, it does
not invidiously discriminate against religion, and therefore
the majority in Davey concluded that the program does not
truly give rise to substantial free exercise dignitary harms that
required its invalidation.
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